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The Original CHAUKIDAAR ,“TAKEOVER WATCHMAN” since 2007. CA. Arun Goenka* hands-on experience in the share market* deep knowledge of laws and account*one of the early players, pioneered an investment strategy in TAKEOVERS*The WIRC - of The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, has honoured him with the ‘Recognition of CAs in Social Service’. * often invited by National business news; electronic and print media, for his views on SEBI related matters. * history of red-flagging 100+ cases to SEBI* contributes by giving inputs in drafting amendments to the regulation* Some of the suggestions reflected in subsequent regulatory changes: (a). In takeover of Cairn 3,750 Crores non-compete fees waived off and ultimately Removal of Non-compete fee in 2011 (b) November 2009 amending Regulation 11 (1). (c)Listing agreement baring promoters from voting on related party. (d) Disclosure of past performance by merchant bankers in case of IPO (e) SAST 2011 regulation 10(1)(h), (f) Counter Offer in case of Delisting (g) Interest payment to all in case of delays in Open Offers(05.06.20).

Friday, July 24, 2020

e- Clerx BUY BACK-- Misuse of Regulations


SMALL INVESTORS’ WELFARE ASSOCIATION

Email : SirenBajao@gmail.com
 Posted on 24th July 2020


TEXT OF LETTER SENT TO SEBI

eCLERX completed recently announce buyback by company in 9 working days ( no buying on 3 days ) as under :
DATE                   QTY
15-7-20                    66,000
16-7-20                   14,00,000
17-7-20                    1,10,814 
20-7-20                     40,000
21-7-20                     3,03,500     
22-7-20                      1,73,501
TOTAL                      20,93,815

The following are very serious observations which SEBI must look into :
1 On detailed scrutiny of large volume on 16-7-20 , we find that out of 1400000 shares purchased by the company,  1126444 shares were purchased from Franklin Templeton Mutual Fund. This constitute 53.79% of maximum buyback size quantity and this is bought from one entity. That too on very second day after buyback of shares was started by the company.
2. This fact about purchase from a single entity should have been disclosed in "Daily Reporting of Shares Bought" by the company which has not been done. 
3. Sebi should have a percentage cap of maximum buy size on buying from one entity.
    Only one or two individuals should not be allowed to benefit of buyback opportunity          extended to all shareholders. Sebi always give preference to minority shareholders.
4. Whether this buyback was announced to bail out troubled Franklin Templeton Fund.
5. Who put order first ? Whether buy order was put first or sell order was put first ? This may bring out Insider Trading violations committed by both party involved,
6. Whether SEBI Regulations needs to be tightened so that companies do not deprive small shareholders the exit opportunity of buyback for which Sebi has permitted a maximum time frame of 6 months to companies to complete the buyback.

UMANATH AGARWAL
   

In tender method special quota of 15% is fixed for small shareholders but in the open market purchase like this more than 50% of the quota was usurped by one single entity.

May we suggest that  
i) there should be a limit of maxium 2% to be bought from one single shareholder during the course of the entire offer and 
ii) in order to allow full opportunity to all the shareholders, no more than 2% of the total amount to be bought can be bought in one single day.

Thursday, July 16, 2020

INDICATIVE TIMELINE FOR VEDANTA DELISTING - Update

INDICATIVE TIMELINE FOR VEDANTA DELISTING
UP-DATE July 17, 2020 

AA had displayed a remarkable speed and things seemed to be on fast track. He even brushed aside legal nuances like appointment of the merchant banker by the Board of directors. The merchant banker was appointed immediately on 12 May itself, even before the Board meeting. 

The  time chart/ schedule given in my earlier post of June 26,2020  was drawn as something that can  be achieved in the shortest possible time. However, it seems that AA has developed some cold feet or is unable to tie-up the desired finance and has till now not even applied to Stock exchanges for "in-principle" approval. As given in the chart below, this is the only open window available to the Acquirer going for delisting, he is allowed to play here for  as much as almost one year. The moment  "in-principle" is applied for, statutorily defined timeline kicks-in. 

To arrive at the likely date for completion of delisting formalities, please add the number of days to the date on which "in-principle" application is made to the Stock Exchanges.  In the table below such date of application has been assumed as July 20, 2020

Acivtity No.
Stipulated time
Date
Event
A
No legal stipulation of time
20-Jul-20
In-Principle Delisting approval to be applied to Stock exchange. It seems that the application for "in-principal" approval has not been made as yet. If the application is made after 20th July 2020, the number of days further delayed after 20.07.20 must be added to all the dates in the series to arrive at the approximate date for each activity
B
A+5
25-Jul-20
SE in-principle approval to be obtained. SE has to respond within 5 days, Reg 8(3)
C
B+1
26-Jul-20
Public Announcement (PA) & Escrow deposit ,  to be made within one day of receipt of 'In-Principal' approval, Reg.10(1)
D
C+2
28-Jul-20
LOO to be dispatched within 2 days of PA , Reg.12(1)
E
C+7
2-Aug-20
RBB to start within 7 days of PA Reg. 13(1)
F
E+5
7-Aug-20
RBB to be open for 5 days Reg. 13(2)
G
E+6
8-Aug-20
RBB to  close
H
G+5
13-Aug-20
Discovered price to be announced within 5 days of closure of RBB. Reg.18
I
G+10
17-Aug-20
payment to be made within 10 days of the closure. Reg.20(2)
J
H+2
15-Aug-20
Fresh PA for Counter offer  and dispatch of LOO within 2 days of announcement of discovered price. Reg 16(1A)
L
J+7
22-Aug-20
Opening of Counter offer bidding process within 7 days of PA
M
L+5
27-Aug-20
Counter offer bidding closes, open for 5 days
N
M+5
1-Sep-20
Success/ failure of counter offer to be announced  Reg.18 /19 within 5 days of closure
O
M+10
6-Sep-20
Payment/Refund of shares



Wednesday, July 8, 2020

SEBI ORDER PENDING FOR BEES SAAL, 2 DECADES - TAKEOVER OF POLO HOTELS LTD.


SMALL INVESTORS’ WELFARE ASSOCIATION
Regn No. F-72744 (M)
With a legacy of 25 years of investor protection services

TEXT OF LETTER WRITTEN TO SEBI
Sub. IMPLEMENTATION OF YOUR ORDER DATED 1ST AUGUST 2003 POLO HOTELS LTD.

SEBI order of 1st  August  2003 having been upheld at all the forums right up to the Supreme Court has not yet been implemented. The biggest challenge in front of SEBI is to get this order implemented and mitigate the sufferings of small shareholders who are suffering for no fault of theirs. On top of this, the practice of allowing the defaulters to pay interest only to the original shareholders has cut the liberties of the poor shareholders to use their own savings for their personal emergency. The case of the biggest non-promoter shareholder  is a great example. he is an highly decorated soldier, now aged about 75 and sick. He is an spinster  and leaves alone at Chandigarh with no one to take care of him. He had invested huge amount in the then most happening hotel company in his city –POLO HOTELS LTD.  He has been holding the shares from a date prior to its takeover. Today, he is living on borrowed money as his investment of crores in Polo Hotels Ltd. is stuck. Because of old age and no personal support/ assistance he often falls down and at times gets admitted to the military hospital, not only for treatment but also for convalescence, since he cannot afford any nurse etc. at home, inspite of crores of Rupees invested in shares of Polo Hotels Ltd.

He cannot sell the shares in Polo Hotels Ltd.  because of fear of losing out on substantial amount to be received as interest for the period of delay; simple interest amount @ 15% ( as per SEBI order dated 01.08.03),for 20 years would be whopping 300% !!! .

The I have been requesting SEBI to implement the offer out of funds from IPEF and after recovery from the acquirers the amount can be replenished. SEBI has, no doubt, passed some very strong and path breaking orders  including the one for disgorgement of  Rs. 11,82,32,526  yet the investors’  misery has not reduced. All the actions by SEBI till date have failed to provide any relief to investors who are suffering for more than 2 decades. The offer is still pending for more than 20 years. 

Some of the orders passed against  the promoters of Polo Hotels Ltd. By SEBI, SAT and

Supreme Court

ORDERS PASSED BY SEBI

Date

Regulation Violated

  Amount 

1-Aug-03

Make a fresh Open Offer  @ 23.75 with interest @ 15% from 16.11.99.

 

28-Feb-19

Insider trading

           200,000

28-Feb-19

Insider trading

           800,000

3-Jun-19

Directions to deposit Rs. 11,94,40,359 for the Open Offer

 11,94,40,359

17-Jul-19

Recovery/ Attachment proceedings No. 4631/2019 Abhey Ram Dahiya

           837,559

29-Nov-19

Violation of Reg.3(2) & 10(6) of SAST 2011 Penalty for allotment of 88,88,889 shares on 09.12.16

      11,500,000

27-Feb-20

SEBI imposed a Penalty of 24 lakhs for non-compliance of its order dated 03.06.19

        2,400,000

9-Mar-20

Disgorgement order

   118,232,526

 

ORDERS PASSED BY SAT

19-Apr-06

SAT order  uphelding SEBI order ("First SAT order")

29-Aug-17

(SAT Appeal no. 205 of 2017),  (“Second SAT Order”) dismissed with cost Rs.50,000/-

15-Feb-19

(Appeal no. 192 of 2018 and Misc. Applications no. 195 of 2018 and 205 of 2018), (“Third SAT Order”) Cost 50,000

ORDERS PASSED BY SUPREME COURT

26-Nov-15

SC upheld the  SEBI order. (Civil Appeal No. 2727 of 2006) First SC Order

13-Jul-16

(“Second Supreme Court Order”) (Review Petition (C) No. 2361 of 2016), which dismissed the same vide an Order dated July 13, 2016 .

2-Mar-17

 (“Third Supreme Court Order”) (Curative Petition (C) No. 66 of 2017), which dismissed the same vide an Order dated March 2, 2017

5-Apr-19

(Civil Appeal no. 2377 of 2019), dismissed (“Fourth Supreme Court Order”). Subsequent to the aforementioned, the Acquirers vide a letter dated April 16, 2019, informed SEBI that they had filed a Review Application before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

 

In the interest of small shareholders, SEBI should implement the offer on behalf of the acquirerout of the enormous amount of funds lying  in the IPEF, subsequently the amount can be recovered and the cash balance replenished in the IPEF.

 

We sincerely urge you to please use the huge amount available with IPEF for the purpose it was originally created -- INVESTOR PROTECTION, rather than allowing it to become just an another source of funds collection for the GOI. Your providing such relief will make the creation and existence of SEBI more meaningful and truthful ;every investor will agree that SEBI is really  “ HER INVESTOR KI TAQAT

Friday, July 3, 2020

SEBI ORDER 05.06.20 - ASTRAZENECA DELISTING

SHALL DO ANYTHING……
KUCH BHI KAREGA

Target Company -AstraZeneca Pharma India Limited

The 65 page SEBI order[1] on AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals AB Sweden in the matter of delisting of  AstraZeneca Pharma India Limited (AstraZenca / AZPIL) reads like a crime novel with minute details of all the murky deals.  Things that should not have happened, did happen. The saga of delisting started in 2004. The first attempt to delist failed because the discovered price of Rs.3,000/- was not acceptable to the promoters. 
The second attempt to delist failed in 2010 as the shareholders did not approve the delisting proposal and the special resolution could not be passed.
In its third attempt, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals AB Sweden, in its wisdom, made a full proof plan for 100% successful delisting. AFSOS SEBI KI PAINI NAZAR PAD GAYE

 As on 31st March 2013, public shareholding in the company was only 10% as against the prescribed norm of 25%. AstraZenca was required to achieve 25% minimum public shareholding by June 03, 2013. ICICI bank was appointed on 28th March 2013 as the merchant banker for OFS, and if required, for delisting. Even before making an OFS, the company and merchant banker were planning for the subsequent delisting.

On 26.3.13 AstraZenca conducted the OFS. Elliot Group, along with 6 FPIs cornered 94% of the shares offered. It was a deliberate strategy to subsequently get the shares of AZPIL delisted at its own convenience and price. The OFS price was deliberately fixed at a significant discount to the market price.  Even though on the previous two trading days, i.e., May 24, 2013 and May 27, 2013, the price of the scrip on NSE closed at Rs. 694.05/- and Rs. 805.3/- respectively, the OFS floor price was fixed at Rs. 490/-. The low floor price for the OFS attracted more bids, but at a lower price. In the last moment, seconds before closure, Elliot Group revised its bid and cornered 94% of OFS shares. The cut-off price after book building, was determined as Rs. 620/- per share.

On 1.3.14 Delisting was announced by AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals AB Sweden. With the help of Elliot Group, the delisting was successful. SEBI passed an order dated June 24, 2014 staying the delisting. This order was  challenged before the Bombay High Court, and subsequently, before the SAT, by two public shareholders of AstraZeneca, namely, Shri Satish Bhatt and Shri Pankaj Bhatt. Hon’ble SAT vide order dated September 11, 2015 remanded the matter back to SEBI with a direction to complete the investigation and to pass appropriate orders within 6 months. 
SEBI passed the order on 5th June 2020. This order censures the acts of the parties involved, the company's promoter and the FII group.   This no doubt is a very mild order by SEBI. The reason for such a mild order could be, IMO, that the parties are foreign entities and as given in the order :
“Elliott Group as on date have already divested their stake in the Company through the open market and the entire public shareholding of the Company is at present dispersed among large number of shareholders which has prima facie dissipated the probability of any foul play by the Company or its promoter in the matter of delisting. Under the circumstances the threat of a manipulated delisting and its adverse impact on the interest of the minority shareholders being no more looming and actions and misdemeanours of the Noticees having failed to hurt the interest of the shareholders, any collusive understanding that was in existence prior to mooting 
delisting proposal and passing a resolution thereon, can be said to have lost its relevance at present.”
 Mr. Rajesh Gajra; Cogencis, Friday, Jun 12 (2020)
Attempted fraud must draw more than just censure
When a company is caught colluding with a large shareholder to defraud other shareholders in a delisting attempt, it must ideally invite commensurate penal action that goes beyond just censure.
But censure is all that Astrazeneca Pharma India's Swedish promoter and a foreign institutional investor group received in an attempted delisting case and a preceding offer for sale issue investigated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India.The Astrazeneca Pharma Case Was One Of A Clear Attempt To Defraud Minority Shareholders And Is Fit For Stringent Penalties.


IMPORTANT EXTRACTS FROM THE ORDER:

In order to give the reader a proper perspective of the matter, Extracted below are some important paras from the SEBI order dated June 5, 2020.

3. In view of the aforesaid findings from the examination, SEBI passed an order dated June 24, 2014, with the following important observations: -
(i) ICICI, i.e., the selling broker, had conducted more than 60 road shows prior to the OFS. The OFS floor price was at significant discount to prevailing market price; still the Elliott Group was able to acquire 94.02% of the total quantity of shares offered through OFS.
(ii) The floor price was kept at ₹490 against the previous day's closing price of ₹805.3, which led the bids (2.84 times oversubscription) in the OFS hover around this price only. This facilitated the Elliott Group to mop up almost all the shares (i.e., 94.02%) offered in OFS at an average price of ₹625.35 which was lower than previous day's closing price by ₹179.95.
(iii) The OFS bid prices of the Elliott Group were significantly above the floor price and the then prevailing indicative price.
(iv) The Elliott Group entities had placed their bids in the OFS in synchronised manner through 6 FIIs/Sub-accounts and the final bid modifications were made few seconds ahead of the market closing.
(v) The Elliott Group entities had no previous exposure to the scrip of AZPIL.
(vi) The delisting offer was subsequently made within one year of OFS.
(vii) Earlier delisting offers were unsuccessful/rejected as the retail shareholders were either demanding a higher price of ₹3000 per share or were not keen to delist the Company.
(viii) Therefore, the shareholders’ resolution passed subsequently, as required for delisting, could not have been successfully passed without favourable voting by the Elliott Group.
(ix) The Elliott Group and the participating FIIs, with their shareholding, i.e., 15.52% of the equity share capital were in a position to ensure that the delisting was successful even if none of the other public shareholders offer their shares.
(x) The Elliott Group by virtue of their 15.52% shareholding as against the 8.89% shareholding of all other public shareholders, had the potential to influence the delisting price in the impending delisting offer in a manner that could be detrimental to the interest of the other public shareholders.

(7) As early as February 10, 2013, before the formal appointment of ICICI, in reply to an e-mail from Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) about assessment of the presentations made by participating banks, Mr. Pawan Singhal (Company Secretary - AZPIL) indicated his preference for selecting ICICI as ICICI would prefer to contact the existing key shareholders informally to get a sense about possibility of delisting at an acceptable price and if that is not feasible then would go full throttle on OFS.
(9) In a series of e-mail correspondences pertaining to prospective investors profiles during OFS road shows between April 20, 2013 and April 26, 2013, it is seen that there were queries from Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP, Corporate Finance, AZ Group) and Mr. Himanshu Agarwal (CFO - AZPIL) to ICICI as to whether the potential investors in AZPIL would like to participate in future delisting of AZPIL, and what would be their investment horizon, risk appetite and investment amount, etc.
(10) ICICI through a reply dated April 25, 2013 to Mr. Ian Brimicombe clarified that investors would be open and in fact would welcome the possibility of delisting. The return expectation would vary with each investor. Further, ICICI offered to work towards developing a consensus amongst investors so that delisting premium is reasonable from the AZ Group perspective while still being acceptable to investors from a return perspective.
(11) AZPAB and ICICI met Elliott Advisors (HK) in Hong Kong on May 15, 2013. The Elliot Group had no previous exposure to the scrip of AZPIL. The interest in the scrip was apparently a result of a road show meeting between AZPAB, Elliott Advisors (HK) and ICICI official on May 15, 2013.
(16) Further, the Elliott Group, while participating in the OFS bid, amended its order in the last minute of the OFS bidding by increasing bid price substantially (from around ₹580 - ₹592 to ₹620 - ₹630) to corner the shares in OFS. It cornered 35,25,773 shares out of 37,49,950 available in OFS by modifying bids in the last few minutes.

(27) After the OFS, the Elliott Group and the promoter of AZPIL have entered into discussions with each other. Mr. Sachin Mistry (Associate Portfolio Manager, Elliott Advisors (HK) Ltd.) met the promoter’s, (i.e., AZPAB) representative Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) separately after the OFS on three occasions starting from July 8, 2013.
(28) Thereafter, on July 09, 2013, a telephonic request was made from AZPAB/ AZ Group to ICICI seeking Internal Rate of Return (hereinafter referred to as “IRR”) calculations to buy out shareholders of AZPIL including the Elliott Group. In the said discussion Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) and Mr. Ravi Talwar (Sr. VP, ICICI) participated.
 (29) It shows that as early as July 9, 2013 AZPAB and ICICI were already engaged in working out the amount of money that may be required to buy out shareholders including the Elliott Group shareholders at various IRRs.
(30) After seeking the IRR details from ICICI, the Elliott Group and Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) again met in London on July 08, 2013. Pursuant to their request, on July 16, 2013 ICICI shared an excel sheet containing IRR calculations to enable AZPAB to buy out shareholders of the Company including the Elliott Group.
(31) Thereafter, vide email dated August 16, 2013, Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ (4) All public investors other than the Elliot Group were unaware that the Elliot Group held 15.5% of shareholding which was sufficient enough to help in passing a delisting special resolution and in determining the price of delisting through the RBB mechanism.
Group) asked ICICI to prepare a revised excel sheet to determine sensible limit and range for negotiations with the Elliott Group. Vide e-mail dated August 16, 2013, Mr. Ian Brimicombe informed ICICI that it would decide its sensible limits for “negotiation with Elliot”.
(32) On August 20, 2013, Mr. Sachin Mistry (Associate Portfolio Manager - Elliott Advisors (HK) Ltd.) met Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) at the Annual General Meeting of AZPIL. Thereafter, they met on October 03, 2013 in London.

(35) Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) vide his email dated September 23, 2013 addressed to Mallon Mark and David Smith (EVP Operations) with copy to Simon Lowth (then CFO and Executive Director), attaching therewith a delisting paper, stated the Elliott Group is willing to sell its stake. The said email stated “We have a single large shareholder owning 15.1% who can determine the delisting outcome and is inclined to sell short term. If we wait, his holding may dissipate over time meaning, it would be more difficult to delist.” It was further mentioned that “Our largest shareholder fund would expect an internal rate of return of at least 25% and possibly as high as 40%. This would be subject to negotiation.” Thereafter, Mr. Ian Brimicombe (VP - Corporate Finance, AZ Group) had a telephonic conversation with Mr. Sachin Mistry (Associate Portfolio Manager, Elliott Advisors (HK) Ltd.) on November 14, 2013.
(4) All public investors other than the Elliot Group were unaware that the Elliot Group held 15.5% of shareholding which was sufficient enough to help in passing a delisting special resolution and in determining the price of delisting through the RBB mechanism.

Consideration of issues:
11. I have gone through the contents of the SCN, replies received in the matter, documents available on record and the written as well as oral submissions made by the Noticees and also the representations made by Mr. Pankaj Bhatt and Mr. Suresh Bhatt. The main allegation against the Noticees is that after having tried unsuccessfully twice in getting the shares of AZPIL delisted, the promoter, i.e., AZPAB (Noticee 1) had devised a scheme or an artifice to get the scrip delisted and as a part of such arrangement the promoter had managed to get the shares of AZPIL subscribed by certain entities, namely, the Elliot Group entities (Noticees 2 - 8) through an OFS so as to ultimately get the scrip delisted successfully in collusion with those Elliot Group entities. Therefore, after completion of the OFS, in order to ensure the delisting of the scrip of AZPIL, the Elliot Group and AZPAB (the promoter of AZPIL) allegedly engaged in negotiations for influencing the delisting price to suit their mutual interest and convenience. The acts of such negotiations that continued between AZPAB and the Elliot Group, with a view to circumvent the fair delisting price discovery through reverse book building mechanism, have been alleged to be fraudulent in nature. The SCN further alleges that all other public investors, other than the Elliot Group entities, were unaware that the Elliot Group entities held 15.5% of shareholding which was sufficient to help AZPIL to get a special delisting resolution passed and to influence the price of delisting in the manner desired by both the parties to such negotiations. It is thus alleged that the promoter of AZPIL and the Elliot Group entities were in talks since July 8, 2013 pursuant to which the promoter had struck a deal with the Elliot Group entities vide which, the Elliot Group entities were to buy shares of AZPIL through an OFS and would again sell those shares back to the promoter at the time of delisting of the equity shares of the Company. It has been accordingly alleged that the Noticees have violated the provisions of Regulations 3(b), (c), (d) and 4(1) of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003.

39. To sum it up, I wish to observe that the Noticees have conducted their affairs in a very self-effacing manner with an ambition to fulfil their goal of delisting with the support of the Elliott Group’ stake without any consideration of the commercial interest of the retail shareholders. However, providentially their plan to execute their ambition through an artifice or device in the form of pre-arranged negotiated price for delisting could not fructify due to judicial intervention and the interest of the minority public shareholders remained protected and saved from being adversely affected by the probable manipulative actions of the Noticees. From the representations received from Mr. Pankaj Bhatt and Mr. Suresh Bhatt, I am apprised that the Elliott Group as on date have already divested their stake in the Company through the open market and the entire public shareholding of the Company is at present dispersed among large number of shareholders which has prima facie dissipated the probability of any foul play by the Company or its promoter in the matter of delisting. Under the circumstances the threat of a manipulated delisting and its adverse impact on the interest of the minority shareholders being no more looming and actions and misdemeanours of the Noticees having failed to hurt the interest of the shareholders, any collusive understanding that was in existence prior to mooting delisting proposal and passing a resolution thereon, can be said to have lost its relevance at present. At the same time, considering the manner in which the Noticees had privately engaged amongst themselves post OFS for the prospect of delisting the scrip of AZPIL without involving or taking into account the interest of other retail shareholders, the Noticees cannot be absolved from the charge of violation of the provisions of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003 by indulging in unfair trade practice which was glaringly evident in their self-serving conduct itself. The series of private correspondences/ discussions that ensued amongst the Noticees as soon as the OFS was over and after the Elliot Group was found to have acquired 15.52% of stake in AZPIL, all behind the back of other public shareholders only to explore the possibility of delisting with the help of the Elliott Group, smack of unethical, opaque and discriminatory conduct of the Noticees displaying unfair treatment to other retail public shareholders, apart from indulging in a collusive scheme to get AZPIL delisted to suit their mutual interest.
40. In view of the foregoing, I, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Sections 11(1) and (4), and 11B read with Section 19 of the SEBI Act, 1992, hereby strongly censure the Noticees for displaying such gross professional misconduct and fraudulent trade practice in trying to arrive at a private arrangement amongst them so as to help the Company sail through the delisting procedure in a manner that was intended to dilute the Reverse Book Building procedure for discovery of the delisting price of the scrip as per stipulations in the SEBI (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2009 thereby jeopardising the interests of the retail public shareholders and investors of the company at large.


[1] WTM/SM/IVD/ID1/7863/2020-21 dated June 5, 2020