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The Original CHAUKIDAAR ,“TAKEOVER WATCHMAN” since 2007. CA. Arun Goenka* hands-on experience in the share market* deep knowledge of laws and account*one of the early players, pioneered an investment strategy in TAKEOVERS*The WIRC - of The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, has honoured him with the ‘Recognition of CAs in Social Service’. * often invited by National business news; electronic and print media, for his views on SEBI related matters. * history of red-flagging 100+ cases to SEBI* contributes by giving inputs in drafting amendments to the regulation* Some of the suggestions reflected in subsequent regulatory changes: (a). In takeover of Cairn 3,750 Crores non-compete fees waived off and ultimately Removal of Non-compete fee in 2011 (b) November 2009 amending Regulation 11 (1). (c)Listing agreement baring promoters from voting on related party. (d) Disclosure of past performance by merchant bankers in case of IPO (e) SAST 2011 regulation 10(1)(h), (f) Counter Offer in case of Delisting (g) Interest payment to all in case of delays in Open Offers(05.06.20).

Friday, January 17, 2014

INTEREST PAYMENT UNDER TAKEOVER CODE BA

RESEARCH PAPER BY CA. ARUN GOENKA- INTEREST PAYMENT UNDER TAKEOVER CODE


BACKGROUND- PAYMENT OF INTEREST UNDER SEBI TAKEOVER CODE

Directing a person to pay interest for the period of delay is the first step towards ensuring timely payment and compliance with law. This is prescribed in all statues. If payment of Income tax, Sales tax etc. is delayed, interest will have to be paid at a rate which is higher than the normal rate. This is to discourage any delay. 
In last few years, Government has also promulgated several strong financial legislations such as Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, Micro, Small And Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, SARFAESI Act etc., wherein high rate of interest, with even monthly compounding, has been stipulated so as to enforce timely compliance and also deter defaulters from unnecessarily delaying the payment.
Supreme Court, in a  Judgment dated 15.04.2010 ( Civil Appeal Nos. 3305-3306 of 2010, M/s. Modern Industries versus  M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. &Ors. ),at para no. 8, stated that " It was felt that the buyers, if required under law to pay interest, would refrain from withholding payments to small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings."

TYPES OF DELAY CALLING FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST IN CASE OF TAKEOVERS

There are 2 types of situation in case of delay in takeovers that require payment of interest.

1.    Delay in announcing the Open offer
2.    After having announced the Open offer, payment is delayed.

The cases of first type of default are covered under 44(i) whereas second type is covered under 22(12). It must be noted here that SAST 1997 44(i) seeks to compensate the investors for delay whereas 22(12) imposes a cost on default and is penal in nature. There are 2 distinct and separate causes of payment of interest and can be argued that both must be applied separately and simultaneously if someone has committed both the defaults. For example NIRMA could have triggered an Open offer, say in the year 2002 but came out with an open offer only in 2005 but subsequently delayed it further, in this case it can invite payment of interest u/r 44(i) as well as 22(12) of SAST 1997. 

SEBI always had the powers to direct payment of interest under the SAST 1997 in the second types of cases, i.e. after having announced the Open offer, payment has not been made. These cases are covered under Regulation 22 (12)

The relevant Regulations 22 (12) reproduced below: (emphasis supplied)

22 (12) The acquirer shall, within a period of fifteen days from the date of the closure of the offer, complete all procedures relating to the offer including payment of consideration to the shareholders who have accepted the offer and for the purpose open a special account as provided under Regulation 29.

Provided that where the acquirer is unable to make the payment to the shareholders who have accepted the offer before the said period of fifteen days due to non-receipt of requisite statutory approvals, the Board may, if satisfied that non-receipt of requisite statutory approvals was not due to any wilful default or neglect of the acquirer or failure of the acquirer to diligently pursue the applications for such approvals, grant extension of time for the purpose, subject to the acquirer agreeing to pay interest to the shareholders for delay beyond fifteen days, as may be specified by the Board from time to time.

The Regulation nowhere discriminates between the original and new shareholder. It says u/r 44(i) “whose shares have been accepted in the public offer”. The very purpose of this amendment was to fortify SEBI directives of paying interest to all the shareholders. Any other position is quite irrational and against the SEBI stand of payment of interest to all.

Regulation 22(12)  says “to the shareholders who have accepted the offer”

In the New SAST 2011 the provisions for interest are appearing at the following places:

A)   18 (11) The acquirer shall be responsible to pursue all statutory approvals required by
the acquirer in order to complete the open offer without any default, neglect or delay:

Provided that where the acquirer is unable to make the payment to
the shareholders who have accepted the open offer within such period owing to
non-receipt of statutory approvals required by the acquirer, the Board may,
where it is satisfied that such non-receipt was not attributable to any willful
default, failure or neglect on the part of the acquirer to diligently pursue such
approvals, grant extension of time for making payments, subject to the acquirer
agreeing to pay interest to the shareholders for the delay at such rate as may be
specified:
B)   32(1) (h) directing the acquirer who has failed to make an open offer or has delayed the
making of an open offer, to make the open offer and to pay interest at such rate
as considered appropriate by the Board along with the offer price;

C)   32(1) (j) directing the acquirer who has made an open offer but has delayed making
payment of the open offer consideration to shareholders, to pay interest at such
rate as considered appropriate by the Board for the delayed period;

In none of the above provisions or anywhere in the takeover code, there is any mention or indication that interest will be paid only to the Original shareholders or that  there are 2 types of Shareholders, one who will get interest and the other who will not. Rather --

·         SAST 1997-In Reg 44 (i) it is clearly written “to pay to the  shareholders, whose shares have been accepted in the public offer made after the delay, the consideration amount along with interest”
·         SAST 1997-In Reg. 22 (12) it says “to the shareholders who have accepted the offer”
·         SAST 2011 Similar emphasis on “interest to the shareholders” “along with the offer price” is found in regulation 18(11)& 32 (1)
·         The emphasis on  “the consideration amount along with interest”  makes interest an integral part of the consideration and cannot be separated.  Denying interest to a section of shareholders would mean that the offer has been allowed at 2 differential prices for different section of shareholders.


CASE FOR SEBI FIRMINGUP ITS STAND ON PAYMENT OF INTEREST UNDER SEBI TAKEOVER CODE

History of Interest payment to investors in the case of Open offers, dates back to the year 2001 when SEBI directed Rhodia S.A. on 19.7.2001, under section 11B of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (the Act) and regulation 10, 12 and 44 of SAST 1997 to pay interest @ 15% to the shareholders of Albright & Wilson Chemicals India Ltd.  Subsequently similar orders were passed against BP, Luxottica and Clariant in the cases of takeover of Castrol, Rayban and Colour Chem respectively.

In case of Castrol all investors did get 15% interest. BP (Castrol) had challenged this in SAT who dismissed its appeal on 5 September 2001. BP filed an appeal in Hon’ble Bombay High Court and lost there as well by a judgment dated 2 May 2002 and paid interest to all the shareholders on the shares accepted in the Open offer @ 15%. Even though by this time SAT order for payment of interest only to original shareholders had come.
Earlier, the powers of SEBI to direct payment of interest was challenged. In Rhodia case “..the learned Senior Counsel submitted that SEBI is an administrative authority with regulatory powers and not plenary ones, ……..that there is no inherent power in an administrative body to direct payment of interest, unless such power is specifically statutorily granted. ………”

SEBI took a stand that it is only a means of compensating the shareholders for the loss that they have suffered because of delay in payment. In a counter argument, the Courts were told that no loss was suffered by the person who was not a shareholder as on the trigger date. Where is the question of compensation to such a person? Hence it was directed that interest be paid only to "continuous shareholders"- persons holding shares on the trigger date& continue to hold them without any break and tendering his shares in the Open offer. SEBI failed to convince the SC even in its review petition that this is absolutely irrational and against the set market concept & practice.

Capital market/share market is one of the most matured market in the world and everything/incident-past, present & future gets discounted in the market price. Some key features are given below:

1.    As per law and capital market practice, all shares should rank paripassu, i.e. all shares are equal and no share would get an advantage or preference over another within the same class of shares.
2.    One can buy the share just before the record date and is entitled to receive – Dividend or Bonus etc. without having to hold it for the whole year.
3.    It can be argued that if a person has not held the share for the whole year, he cannot be entitled to the share of profit earned during that year.
4.    Similarly there can be a counter argument that if a person held the share for the whole year, the profit of that year must be paid out to him immediately without he being asked to hold the shares till record date.
5.    If interest is denied on the ratio of "continuous shareholding"  why the same person should not be denied the opportunity to participate in the Open offer on the same ground that he was not holding shares on the  trigger date.
6.    In case of loss- say SATYAM type fraud, the shareholders who were not holding the shares on the dates when the fraud was committed, must not be asked to bear the brunt. The loss must be recovered from the shareholders holding the shares as on the fraud/loss dates. 
7.    Why would someone simply lose his entitlement if there has been a death of his parents because of this the holders name got changed due to succession?
8.    Why would someone simply lose his entitlement because there has been reorganization of multiple DP A/cs or family holding transposing the names of husband & wife etc.?
9.    Any company holding shares can lose the benefit because of merger or change in name etc. UTI was able to get special exemption but what about others?
10. Why would a small shareholder lose his right to sell his shares and use the funds for his pressing needs- might be marriage or sickness, simply because a rogue is delaying discharge of his obligation?
11. If SEBI fails to ensure equal right to all shareholders, it is distortion of capital market price discovery process. It is discrimination - one set of shareholders gets interest and another set holding the very same shares does not get any interest.
12. Why should the defaulters be allowed to enrich themselves with the ill-gotten wealth that belongs to the shareholders?
13. Why the shareholders who could not hold on to their shares be deprived of their money? Against the market norm, it is decided that only the continuous shareholders  will be paid interest under the Open offer, then the acquirer must be directed to distribute the so unpaid interest to such shareholders.
14. The entire amount payable as interest under the offer must be either distributed amongst the participating continuous shareholders or the balance amount not paid out should be distributed amongst the non participating continuous shareholders or else it should be deposited in Investors Protection Fund.
15. SEBI had already done a remarkable work of disgorging & distributing profit in case of IPO scam, why not here?

SEBI realized the flaw in its Takeover regulation and amended it.
Regulation 44 ( i ) regarding interest was inserted vide Second Amendment Regulations w.e.f. 09.09.2002.(emphasis supplied)
“44 (i) directing the person concerned, who has failed to make a public offer or delayed the making of a public offer in terms of these Regulations, to pay to the  shareholders, whose shares have been accepted in the public offer made after the delay, the consideration amount along with interest at the rate not less than the applicable rate of interest payable by banks on fixed deposits.”


SEBI NEEDS TO COME OUT OF THE SHACKLES OF SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT IN COLOUR CHEM CASE

Can you imagine citing & following the Supreme Court (SC) decision in Vodafone even after the amendment specifically carried out to overcome this decision? Well this is happening in the capital markets under SEBI.

This relates back to acquisition of Colour Chem by Clariant in 1997. In the then prevailing legal context SC ruled that in case of defaults by acquirer interest needs to be paid only to “ continuous shareholders” defined as those who were the shareholders on the trigger date, continued to hold them without any break and tendering in the offer. After the debacle at SC, SEBI realized that  it needs to fortify its Takeover regulations to ensure capital market integrity and  equal treatment to all shareholders and amended it Regulation w.e.f. 09.09.02 by inserting Reg.44(i) as discussed above. However, the Colour Chem judgement is yet being blindly followed by SEBI although it is not applicable at all.

Examine the following points:

1.    Open offer of Colour chem was triggered much earlier than 09.09.02, the date on which 44(i) was inserted in SAST 1997
2.    The very reason of inserting 44(i) was to fortify SEBI’s stand that interest must be paid to all the shareholders. Not enforcing it makes the entire exercise futile.
3.     44 (i) of SAST 1997 has never been challenged and judgement based on a legal position prior to the  birth of 44(i)  cannot be applied after its birth.
4.    Even if, for argument’s sake, it is accepted that ColurChem judgement will be applicable in cases of interest under 44(i), it cannot be extended to Interest u/r 22(12). These 2 are absolutely different in nature
5.  The omnibus Colour Chem judgement, overriding the laws & regulations cannot be followed in SRMTL case. It became redundant and inapplicable after SAST  Regulations 1997 was changed w.e.f. 09.09.02. Interest obligation on NIRMA falls u/r 22(12) being type (B) default. Even NIRMA said it does not fall under (A). SC never decided on type (B) cases which are independent of losses to shareholders, yet SEBI seems to be blindly following it
6.    Regulation 44(i) & 22(12) are very much part of the statute book. These have not been challenged or been pronounced invalid by any Court. Both stipulate interest payment to all.
7.   The existing legal provisions must be honoured by implementing them. Hon’ble Supreme Court can only interpret the existing law. Any past judgement cannot nullify a new law, much less a law enacted especially to overcome the short coming of the old law. 

All the cases where Supreme Court had allowed interest to be paid only to Shareholders who were continuously holding the shares were pertaining to takeovers triggered prior to 09.09.2002, (though the P A might have been announced much later).  There has been no instance where SEBI has directed payment of interest ‘to all the shareholders who have accepted the offer’ and it has been rejected by any tribunal or Court. SEBI on its own refuses to come out of Shackles of SC judgment prior to 09.09.02 amendment. Investors are paying a very heavy price for this indifferent attitude of SEBI while the defaulters are laughing their way to the bank. 



SOME RECENT CASES WHERE INTEREST WAS PAID TO ALL THE SHAREHOLDERS

Some cases of payment of interest to all u/r 22(12) are given below:
THOMAS COOK June 2008
In case of Thomas Cook the delay was because of getting RBI approval.- SEBI directed the Acquirer to pay Interest u/r 22(12) to all the shareholders. SEBI did not allow adjustment of Dividend.
RANBAXY Reg 22(12) Extract from PA  (interest to all)
Interest at 10% (as directed by SEBI vide letter dated October 07, 2008) from September 20, 2008 till October 14, 2008 (i.e. for 25 days) on the Offer consideration has also been paid to the shareholders who validly tendered their equity shares and whose shares have been accepted under the offer.
KAMAT HOTELS (INDIA) LIMITED January 11, 2012
Extracts from P.A.(Interest to all)
SEBI, in its observation letter dated November 30, 2012 (“Observation Letter”), has inter-alia made the
following observations:
The price calculated assuming the execution of the Inter-se Agreement triggered an open offer under Regulation 12 of the Old Regulations along with interest @ 10% per annum for delay thereon i.e., from August 13, 2010 (being the date of execution of the Inter-se Agreement) until January 11, 2012 (“Delayed Period”);
STI India Limited -- Extracts from P.A. dated 27 Jun 2012  (interest to all) 
Interest is being paid on the Offer Price for delay beyond the original scheduled date of opening. Pursuant to the same, interest of 49 paise (calculated at the rate of 10% p.a. from April 30, 2012 (proposed date of opening the offer) to June 30, 2012 (actual date of opening of the offer) is payable to the Shareholders whose Equity Shares have been validly tendered and accepted

United Spirits Limited- interest to all
As described in the announcement dated February 10, 2013, the Offer Price would be paid together with interest computed at the rate of 10 per cent per annum on the Offer Price from March 19, 2013 till the date of actual payment to all the Public Shareholders who successfully tender their Equity Shares in the Offer.

It is the onerous duty of SEBI to maintain market integrity. SEBI must ensure the very basic tenets of the share market that all shares that are bought come with all the benefits that have accrued thereon.

The current disposition of SEBI incentivizes delays and defaults under Open offers/Takeovers. The more a defaulter delays the payout under an Open offer, the lesser is his cost or rather higher is his profits. This happens on 2 counts:

1.    Firstly he gets to use the Funds for years at unimaginably cheap rate -10% flat. This is lower than yield on G-Sec, (currently at 8.87%) annually compounded for 5 years. Whereas the defaulters’ might have to pay otherwise 12 to 24% compounded/payable monthly/quarterly/half yearly or annually.
2.    Secondly the more he delays, lesser will be the no. of persons to whom he will have to make payment.  Interest payment in respect of "continuous shareholders" will gradually, but definitely, diminish owing to efflux of time as well as market dynamics. This saving could be 70% to 90%.
3.    Table showing extent of undue enrichment by the defaulting Acquirers at the cost of Investors is given below:


                                                         NAME OF THE TARGET COMPANY
PARTICULARS
COLOUR-CHEM
RAYBAN SUN OPTICS
FALCON TYRES
OFFER PRICE WITHOUT INTEREST
318.00
104.30
151.71
INTEREST PAYABLE PER SHARE
149.62
80.95
37.51
TOTAL PRICE PER SHARES
467.62
185.25
189.22
INTEREST AS % OF  OFFER PRICE
47.05%
77.61%
24.72%
OFFER SIZE-NO. OF SHARES
23.30
75.45
11.36
NO. OF SHARES ACQUIRED
23.30
64.54
6.60
TOTAL INTEREST LIABILITY
3,486.15
6,107.68
426.11
ACTUAL INTEREST PAID
2,291.55
394.81
43.86
INTEREST DENIED
1,194.60
5,712.87
382.25
INTEREST ACTUALLY PAID / TOTAL INTEREST LIABILITY
65.73%
6.46%
10.29%
INTEREST  DENIED / TOTAL INTEREST LIABILITY
34.27%
92.44%
82.27%
TRIGGER DATE
24-Feb-98
27-Aug-99
2-Jun-06
OFFER CLOSING DATE
27-Jun-05
14-May-07
10-Jun-09
Figures in Lacs (except per share)



THE CURRENT CASE OF NIRMA’S OPEN OFFER OF SHREE RAMAMULTITECH(SRMTL)


As discussed above the basic difference between 44(i) & 22(12) of SAST 1997 is, 44(i) seeks to compensate the investors for delay whereas 22(12) is penal in nature.

In a written reply to your writer’s complaint, the Acquirer has vide its Merchant Banker’s letter dated September 6, 2013 inter alia stated that regulation 44(i) is not applicable in this case. Payment of interest only to original shareholders was justified citing Colour chem case and subsequent SEBI order in cases of Khaitan Electricals, FAL Industries & Saurastra Cement. This is a self defeating reply. The proverbial “Self Goal”. On the one hand they say 44 (i) is not applicable in this case and yet they take shelter under all cases of first kind of default that are covered under SAST 1997 reg.44(i).
The background of the case is given below:

1.    NIRMA had announced the PA for Open Offer of Shree Rama Multitech Ltd. on 27 July 2005 and thereafter sought to withdraw it on the flimsy ground of discovery of embezzlement of funds of SRMTL.
2.    The Clariant International Ltd. / Colour Chem case can apply only to those takeovers triggered prior to 09.09.2002 and not to SRMTL case, as its takeover was triggered on 25.07.2005, i.e. much after the promulgation of Regulation 44 ( i ), which statutorily mandates payment of interest to ALL SHAREHOLDERS WHOSE SHARES HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED IN THE OPEN OFFER.
3.    Although NIRMA had contended before SAT  that they were not even its ( SRMTL ) shareholders pls refer 10th / 11 th lines of para no.3 of SAT Order dated 05.06.2008 - but the fact is that the present acquirers, Nirma Chemical Works Ltd. and Nirma Industries Ltd, were not just ordinary shareholders but Promoters / Persons acting in Concert of SRMTL, during the material and crucial period of 30.06.2003 to 30.09.2005, as revealed by the quarterly shareholding patterns filed on BSE for the said period.
4.    After the PA for Open Offer was announced on 25.07.2005, the aforesaid shareholding was re-classified from PROMOTER category to NON - PROMOTER, as is evident from the BSE shareholding pattern as on 30.09.2005, obviously with some mala fide intent.
5.    This fact of NIRMA being Promoters / PAC of SRMTL was not cited in the SAT Order dtd. 05.06.2008. NIRMA's statement of being unaware of the financial condition of SRMTL and inadequate due diligence is devoid of any credence. Further the fact of NIRMA being a PAC / Promoters of SRMTL, raises a doubt on their possible collusion in siphoning of funds, as a Promoter / PAC of SRMTL.
6.    Another NIRMA co., namely Nirma Credit & Capital Ltd. ( holding  8,00,000 shares ) has been a shareholder since inception, i.e. 31.03.2001, as per the shareholding pattern for Q.E. 31.03.2001, which proves NIRMA's blatant misstatement before SAT.
7.    Although NIRMA has been deriding SRMTL as having lost its substratum and hence worthless and threatening to walk away there from without completing the open offer, it, quite amusingly, is leaving no stone unturned to acquire a very substantial stake in SRMTL through a Scheme of Arrangement at a very cheap rate after wiping out 90% of the equity stake of the small shareholders. 
8.    Previously, two such schemes, being Company Petition No. 111 of 2005 and 403 of 2007, were filed and later withdrawn due to objections by lenders and shareholders. Another Company Petition No. 401 of 2008 is pending before High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, wherein the shareholding of small shareholders will be reduced by 90% and NIRMA will be issued a huge stake of fresh 21,00,00,000 shares in the form of equity shares @ Rs. 1.00. The resultant effect of such a prejudicial scheme will be that the percentage shareholding of retail shareholders will fall from 32.22 % to merely 3.17 %; whereas that of NIRMA will go up from 22.51 % to 67.45 % (based on shareholding pattern as on 31.03.2008 / 01.04.2008 and Scheme of Arrangement ).  
9.    Interest at 10% simple rate is a bonus to the defaulters rather than a deterrent or punishment. The result is Acquirers like NIRMA are continuing to delay the Open Offer because it serves to their advantage. They lost the appeal in Supreme Court on 9 May 2013 but has only recently filed the Draft Letter of Offer (DLOF) uploaded on SEBI site on 12 August 2013. The reason is, with each passing day, they accumulate profit for themselves because of very low simple rate of interest they have to pay to the investors. It will be pertinent to note that earlier the rate of Interest the acquirers were asked to pay was as high as 15% - in case of BP- Castrol etc.  
10. The present Open Offer is in continuation of the Public Announcement dated 25 July 2005 (PA) by NIRMA. Any variation in the terms of the offer that is detrimental to the Minority shareholders/investors cannot be accepted. In the PA there was no mention of 2 class of shareholders. As per clause 8.15 it was open to all shareholders – registered or unregistered.  Rather with an * mark it was clarified that “Specified Date is only for the purpose of determining the names of the shareholders as on such date to whom the Letter of Offer would be sent. The clause is reproduced below:

 8.15 *Specified Date is only for the purpose of determining the names of the shareholders as on such date to whom the Letter of Offer would be sent. All owners (registered or unregistered) of equity shares of the Target Company, (except the Acquirers and Pledger Sellers) are eligible to participate in the Offer anytime before the closure of the Offer

11. Interest is an integral part of the price consideration, allowing payment of interest only to some special class of shareholders would mean that there is a differential pricing in the offer. This offer has been cleared by SEBI allowing an opportunity to NIRMA to deny interest of Rs.14.31 to hapless investors majority of who will be paid@ 18.60 instead of 32.91 per share i.e 56.52% less.
12. In case of delay clause 6.3 of the PA states:

In case of delay in receipt of any statutory approvals, SEBI has the power to grant an extension of the time required for payment under the Offerprovided that the Acquirers agree to pay Interest in accordance with Regulation 22(12) of the Regulations.
Further, if the delay occurs due to wilful default of the Acquirers in obtaining the requisite approvals, Regulation 22(13) of the Regulations will also become applicable.  


NIRMA must be asked to pay interest to all the shareholders whose shares are accepted. Some key points as discussed above are highlighted here:

1.    Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Colour Chem was based on the law/regulation existing at that time. Thereafter the law was changed with effect from 09.09.02 and cannot be applied to subsequent cases.
2.    The amendment in the Takeover Regulations by inserting Reg. 44(i) was specifically with the objective of ensuring equal treatment & interest payment to all the shareholders. Not enforcing this shows scant regard by SEBI towards its own regulation. 
3.    Interest is an integral part of the price. The regulations direct it to be paid along with the offer price. There cannot be 2 prices in Open offers.
4.    The NIRMA offer is in continuation of the Public Announcement made earlier in which no such distinction between shareholders was made, now it cannot be allowed to be amended to the detriment of investors.
5.    NIRMA is a willful defaulter and has not been truthful in its submission to SEBI or Courts, it needs to be further penalized rather than rewarded by allowing them not to pay interest to all the shareholders.Regulation 22(12) will be applicable.
6.    If NIRMA is adjudged a wilful defaulter as it has not been truthful in its submission to SEBI or courts, it needs to be further penalized rather than rewarded by allowing them not to pay interest to all the shareholders As per the earlier PA given by NIRMA, it has accepted that in case of delay regulation 22(12) & 22(13) will be applicable.
  
Yet SEBI has allowed NIRMA to pay interest only to the continuous shareholders. SEBI seems to have been influenced by the hollow argument given by the Acquirer that Regulation 22(12) of SAST 1997 is not applicable because “the offer never commenced” and “that the provision only applies where an acquirer defaults in making payment to shareholders within 15 days from the date on which the offer closes.” 
This is nothing but manipulation of the law. Regulation 22 (12) says “ fifteen days from the date of the closure of the offer”, It is “the date of closure of the offer” NOT  “ fifteen days from the date on which the offer closes or offer has closed”.  NIRMA is suggesting that since the offer never commenced, this regulation is inapplicable.  The “Date of closing of the offer” in the PA dated 25 July, 2005 in clause no.8.15 is given as 4th October, 2005. Regulation refers to scheduled date of closure not the actual date on which the offer has closed, otherwise all the defaulters will go Scott free.


SEBI has immense depth of legal wisdom and can easily see through the designs of such ill-conceived argument devoid of any merit and can prove that it is  “HAR INVESTOR KI TAAQAT”


 

CA. ArunGoenka